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“Justice is essentially to be thought of  as a principle (or 
set of  principles) for resolving conflicting claims.” David 
Harvey.1 
Who’s afraid of relativism?
For more than four decades, social justice has 
been a central motif  of  radical spatial thought in 
human geography and related fields, a focus of  
attention of  thinkers including David Harvey, Da-
vid Smith, Susan Fainstein, Ed Soja, and Michael 
Storper. “Geographies of  justice” has even been 
formally recognised as a flourishing field of  cut-
ting edge research in the discipline.2 But while geo-
graphers talk a lot about justice, they also express 
a recurring ambivalence towards the universalizing 
register which justice-talk always seems to bring 
with it. Geography is after all, all about an appre-
ciation of  differentiation, pluralism, and variety. 
This commitment seems to run against the grain 
of  normative discourses that lay claim to compre-
hensive coverage. Nevertheless, geographers who 
have addressed issues of  justice consistently worry 
that both the facts of  geographical variation and 
post-Enlightenment intellectual trends undermine 
what is still considered a necessary condition for 
arriving at critical judgements: access to some sort 
1. Harvey, D. 1973. Social Justice and the City. Lon-
don, Edward Arnold, p. 97.
2. See Higher Education Funding Council of  England. 
2015. Research Excellence Framework 2014: Overview report 
by Main Panel C and Sub-panels 16 to 26. Bristol, HEFCE, 
pp. 35-36. 
of  universal criterion that allows one to determine 
whether some state of  affairs qualifies as unjust.
I want to suggest that the ambivalence to-
wards normative theories of  justice evident in 
Geography is actually a function of  a continuing 
commitment to thinking of  justice primarily as an 
ideal; an ideal towards which one must strive. It is 
a way of  thinking that means that the wrongs of  
the injustice are always assumed to show up as an 
absence of  justice.3 
The tendency to think of  difference, variety, 
and pluralism as a threat to universal criteria of  
justice arises from an inclination to think that the 
value of  universalism lies in an aspiration towards 
impartiality. To think that the main issue to be 
addressed is one of  universality versus particularity ge-
nerates the temptation to reassert some principle 
of  universal validity that can synthesise across ob-
servable differences and variety.4 What gets lost in 
3. The case presented in this paper is a condensed and 
partial version of  an argument developed at length, 
and justified in detail, in Barnett, C. (Forthcoming), The 
Priority of  Injustice: Locating Democracy in Critical Theory, 
Athens GA, University of  Georgia Press. The paper is 
a revised version of  a Lecture presented at the Annual 
Meeting of  Finnish Geographers in Tampere in Octo-
ber 2015.  
4. See Smith, D.M. 2000. Social justice revisited. Envi-
ronment and Planning A, 32, 1149-1162.
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the worry about the threat of  particularism, and 
the related anxiety about the spectre of  relativism, 
is a recognition that debates about the univer-
sal status of  normative concepts tend to revolve 
around the confrontation between two different 
senses of  “the universal”: the universal as a stan-
dpoint of  impartiality; and universality as a hori-
zon of  inclusion. In the work, for example, of  Iris 
Marion Young, a key reference point for debates 
in Geography about justice, the central conceptual 
and normative challenge is not one of  opposing 
the universal to the particular, and much less one 
of  opposing the universal to “contingency” as in 
strands of  post-structuralist scepticism. The chal-
lenge of  Young’s work was, and remains, that of  
confronting the claims of  impartial universalism em-
bedded in political thought with the claims of  in-
clusive universalism through which claims of  justice 
are often articulated. 
It should also be acknowledged that a concern 
with normative issues of  justice is increasing-
ly at odds with the styles of  strongly ontological 
theorizing now favoured by prevalent strands of  
critical spatial theory. From this perspective, the 
focus of  political thought should be relocated to 
elaborating on the ontological conditions from 
which genuinely transformational political ener-
gies might be unleashed. But rather than abando-
ning the terrain of  justice for deeper and deeper 
levels of  ontological creativity, we might do well 
to follow the path of  an observable shift in cri-
tical democratic theory towards giving priority to 
the conceptualization of  injustice independently 
from a prior formulation of  a universal principle 
of  justice. Thinking in terms of  “the priority of  
injustice” is a path to disrupting the theoretical or-
der that means that injustice only shows up as the 
bracketing of  ideals of  justice, a way of  thinking 
that ontological styles of  thought leave intact. It is 
a move that, on the one hand, accords primacy to 
the sense of  injustice that animates demands for 
justice; but on the other hand it also makes public 
practices of  acknowledgement, rationalization and 
justification quite central to the articulation of  in-
justice. 
 The priority of injustice
As I have already said, Geography has an ambi-
valent attitude towards the universal register that 
justice-talk always brings with it. The ambivalence 
is most often finessed by the implicit or explicit 
declaration of  an elective affinity between radical 
scholarship and movements struggling for justi-
ce. David Harvey, for example, suggests that the-
re are three ways in which normative issues can 
be approached: through philosophical reflection; 
through the development of  frameworks of  basic 
human needs; or through alignment with the fer-
ment of  social movements, the route he recom-
mends.5 
Geography is a resolutely moralist discipline, 
and yet geographers remain rather averse to spen-
ding much time on normative questions about 
whether and how and why observable patterns of  
inequity, discrimination, or unevenness are actual-
ly unjust. This aversion is sometimes sustained by 
the elaboration of  complex accounts of  “the pro-
duction of  space” or the relational “production 
of  subjectivity” and by grand narratives of  “neoli-
beralization”, all of  which are assumed to provide 
the explanatory key to understanding the causes 
of  injustice. From these perspectives, one always 
already knows in advance that distributive con-
cepts of  justice and rights-discourse obscure and 
sustain the more fundamental sources of  injustice 
generated by class power, property relations, ac-
cumulation by dispossession, and workplace ex-
ploitation, mediated, of  course, by dynamics of  
gender, race or sexuality, and state formation. It 
is assumed that the task of  “critical” analysis is to 
reveal the fundamental sources of  injustice by un-
masking the exclusionary, naturalizing, or essenti-
alizing effects of  flat, absolute, fixed concepts of  
space, of  hierarchy, of  identity, or of  authority. 
Now, one might be tempted to argue that the 
aversion to normative reasoning in Geography 
leaves the critical judgements so central to radical 
scholarship drastically weakened by having no st-
rong justificatory foundation.6 But the danger in 
too quickly accepting this argument is that one 
is tempted to present one’s own favoured model 
of  universal needs, capabilities, or values. Perhaps 
the recurring wariness of  theorising about justice 
in fields of  critical human geography should be 
interpreted in a more charitable light. Perhaps it 
can be seen as an index of  styles of  analysis that 
seek to make explicit the senses of  injustice that 
animate particular fields of  contention. Debates 
about environmental justice, as well as debates 
about “the right to the city”, are examples of  this 
form of  analysis. They draw into view two im-
portant issues for how we think about the rela-
5. Harvey, D. 2009. Cosmopolitanism and the Geo-
graphies of Freedom. New York, Columbia University 
Press, p. 94.
6. See Olsen, E. and Sayer, A. Radical geography and its 
critical standpoints: embracing the normative. Antipode 
41:1, 180-198. 
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tionship between justice and injustice. First, one 
finds in these fields the idea that normative under-
standings of  justice are worldly principles, which 
emerge from situated conflicts and orient action.7 
Second, one also finds in these fields the implicit 
idea that critical analysis starts not so much from 
a clear-sighted definition of  justice, but from a 
shared abhorrence at some form of  wrong. 
There is, certainly, an increasing focus on the 
theme of  injustice, or “(in)justice”, in Geography. 
But it is also true that when critical human geo-
graphers address questions of  injustice, the focus 
most often remains on analysing the dynamics of  
resistance to taken-for-granted sources of  harm: 
patterns of  capitalist exploitation of  labour and 
the degradation of  the environment; formations 
of  gendered, sexualised, and racialized oppressi-
on.8 Or, in forms of  radical Left empiricism, the 
amassing of  empirical data on patterns of  inequali-
ty is equated with mapping injustice, the persistence 
of  which is attributed to persistence of  a set of  
“beliefs”.9 These ways of  acknowledging injustice 
as an animating dynamic of  political life only end 
up reproducing the same pattern of  ideal theories 
of  justice, in which injustice appears as the sus-
pension of  justice. 
The idea of  starting-off  from injustice is one 
that we should certainly take seriously, I think, but 
it is important to avoid the impression that one 
could reconstruct the meaning of  justice by tra-
cing the explicit content of  visible expressions of  
feelings of  injustice. The argument for “the prio-
rity of  injustice” should not be interpreted as re-
quiring an elective identification with favoured ac-
tivist voices or with the expressions of  victims. To 
understand why, we need to dwell a little longer 
on the significance of  the idea of  “the sense of  
injustice” that lies behind the argument for giving 
priority to injustice in critical theory.
On the sense of injustice
Giving priority to injustice involves, in no small 
part, affirming the affective dynamics through 
which political action is generated as a response to 
7. See Fincher, R. and Ivesen, K. 2012. Justice and 
Injustice in the City. Geographical Research 50:3, 
231-241.
8. See Merrifield, A. and Swyngedouw, E. (eds.). 1995. 
The Urbanization of Injustice. London, Lawrence and 
Wishart; McLeod, G. and McFarlane, C. (eds.). 2014. 
Introduction: Grammars of  Injustice. Antipode 46, 
857-873.
9. Dorling, D. 2015. Injustice: Why Social Inequality 
Still Persists. Bristol, Policy Press. 
varied forms of  harm, injury, or maltreatment. We 
might view this affirmation as simply a variation 
on a long-standing idea most famously associated 
with David Hume, for whom passions and affec-
tions motivate action.10 The important implication 
is that acting, including acting morally, is not best 
understood as dependent on grasping and app-
lying a rational principle or truth. The point of  af-
firming this is not to assert, either in a celebratory 
way or as a matter to be bemoaned, that reason is 
merely an ephemera placed over a roiling tumult 
of  unruly emotions. That conclusion holds fast 
to a single picture of  reason opposed to passion, 
when in fact the point of  the affirmation is to 
encourage us to change our picture of  reasoning 
and rationality.11 The significant implication of  the 
affirmation is that any concern for justice has its 
origins in capacities to be moved by injustice, and 
that our picture of  reasoning about justice needs 
to be adjusted accordingly.  
The feeling for justice is often associated with po-
sitive affects - with dispositions towards compas-
sion, empathy, and forgiveness - all of  which it is 
easily assumed can and should be actively cultiva-
ted and harnessed towards greater fairness.12 But 
what are we to make of  an assertion like that of  
Simon Critchley, who argues that the centrality of  
injustice to thinking about emancipatory politics 
follows from a recognition that anger is the “the 
first political emotion”.13 Anger, he argues, is the 
emotion generated in contexts of  “political disap-
pointment” and is the emotion that moves the 
subject to action. Whether or not we agree that 
there is a primary political emotion, Critchley’s 
argument is consistent with the observation that 
making the case for giving priority to injustice is 
closely associated with a re-centring of  questions 
of  emotion and passion in accounting for political 
action. But if  anger is one’s favoured example of  
a political emotion that motivates action against 
injustice, as it is for Critchley, then this means that 
a feeling for justice does not necessarily depend 
only on positive feelings. It might also depend on 
10. Hume, D. 1999. An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 
161-162. 
11. See Zerilli, L. 2015. The Turn to Affect and the 
Problem of  Judgment. New Literary History 46:2, 
261-286.
12. See Wright, M. 2010. Geography and gender: 
Feminism and a feeling of justice. Progress in Human 
Geography 34, 818-827.
13. Critchley, S. 2007. Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of 
Commitment, Politics of Resistance. London, Verso, 
p. 130.
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a series of  what Robert Solomon once called “the 
antipathetic passions”, such as envy and jealousy 
and resentment and outrage and revenge and in-
dignation.14 Another way of  glossing the point is 
that we should not presume that understanding 
the feelings that animate a concern with injustice 
is an excuse to reduce these matters to a concern 
with the cultivation of  ethical relationships. Justice 
may or may not be thought of  as a virtue. But the 
argument for the priority of  injustice should cer-
tainly not be reduced to that dimension of  human 
affairs alone. 
The case for giving priority to injustice in cri-
tical theory is associated with an argument, most 
clearly developed in strands of  analytical politi-
cal philosophy, for giving greater attention to the 
“sense of  injustice” in moral reasoning. It is an 
argument primarily associated with Judith Shklar.15 
In The Faces of  Injustice, Shklar observed that jus-
tice was the privileged object of  normative the-
orising in political philosophy, whereas injustice 
has most often been thought of  an empirical or 
worldly fact that is primarily thought of  as a lack 
of  justice. Her argument is that moral and poli-
tical philosophy (she has in mind the egalitarian 
tradition of  thought represented and revived by 
John Rawls) takes for granted that “injustice is 
simply the absence of  injustice, and that once we 
know what is just, we will know all we need to 
know.”16  She calls this assumption the “normal” 
way of  thinking about justice, in which the task 
of  moral reasoning is taken to be the definition 
of  the ideal model of  a just society, against which 
actual examples of  social arrangements can be cri-
tically evaluated. 
One of  Shklar’s most important claims is that 
there is a fundamental asymmetry between justi-
ce and injustice. Justice, she argues, “radiates no 
emotional appeal”.17 This is a function of  its pur-
ported value, of  course, which lies in no small 
part in the aspiration to universality as impartiality. 
On the other hand, the sense of  injustice is affective-
ly rich in a way that doing justice is not. Injustice, 
to put it another way, is felt and necessarily parti-
cular and partial, in a way in which justice is not 
and is not meant to be. 
The most powerful claim made by Shklar is 
that the fundamental weakness of  existing the-
14. Solomon, R. C. 1990. A Passion for Justice: Emo-
tions and the Origins of the Social Contract. Reading 
MA, Addison-Wesley Publishing, p. 245.
15.  Shklar, J. 1990. The Faces of Injustice. Cambridge 
MA, Harvard University Press.
16. Shklar, 1990, p. 15.
17. Shklar, 1990, 103.
ories of  justice arises from the absence of  the 
perspective of  victims of  injustice. These theories 
tend to be resolutely monological in tone. Howe-
ver, her critique of  the normal model of  justice 
should not be mistaken for an argument about 
simply aligning oneself  with victims of  injustice. 
Shklar does not suppose that the task of  theory is 
to develop a standard against which claims can be 
adjudicated. Her concern remains focussed on the 
political question of  how to evaluate claims and 
expressions of  injustice. The argument that the 
perspective of  the victims must be included in an 
account of  injustice is related to the argument that 
it is not just enough to listen and affirm the claims 
of  injustice. That might actually be one route to 
reproducing injustice of  certain sorts. But rather 
than presume that those claims are to be adjudi-
cated by philosophical legislators or explained by 
social scientists, Shklar insists that making sense 
of  claims of  injustice must takes place through 
forms of  public intercourse. It is an argument, 
one amongst a broader family of  critical analytical 
thought, that turn seeks to dethrone an impartial 
model of  universal rationality by according a cent-
ral value to the public sharing and evaluation of  
narratives of  felt senses of  injustice.  
It is important to underscore that the emphasis 
on the sense of  injustice is not meant to assert 
a non-rational kernel at the core of  political life. 
The force of  Shklar’s argument lies in the way it 
shifts the picture we have of  the tasks of  critical 
analysis. We can grasp this force better by consi-
dering the argument developed by Cora Diamond 
about the situations from which responses to in-
justice arise. Elaborating on an issue central also 
to Shklar’s argument, Diamond presumes that 
there is a difference in the position of  the victims 
of  injustice and those placed in a position of  res-
ponse. Diamond asks us to focus on the difficulty 
of  responding to injustice as injustice.18 And her 
claim is that justice is derived not first and fore-
most from considerations of  universal rights but 
from relations of  attention: “the capacity to res-
pond to injustice as injustice depends, not on the 
capacity to work out what is fair, but on the capa-
city really to see, really to take in, what it is for a 
human being to be harmed. This is not easy for 
us; it requires a recognition of  our own vulnerabi-
lity, and there are not comparable demands on us 
in thinking about the deprivation of  rights.”19 For 
18. See Diamond, C. 2001. Injustice and animals. In. C. 
Elliot (ed.), Slow Cures and Bad Philosophers: Essays 
on Wittgenstein, Medicine, and Bioethics. Durham, 
NC, pp. 118-148.
19. Diamond, 2001, p. 120-121. 
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Diamond, the “capacity to respond to injustice as 
injustice” does not involve calculating fair shares 
from a distance, nor an appreciation of  philoso-
phical arguments about shared capacities for rea-
soning, or indeed for suffering. It arises first and 
foremost from the difficult acceptance by a sub-
ject of  their own of  vulnerability, a response that 
arises in a scene of  acknowledgment of  the claims of  
others rather than in a knowing relation of  what is 
right, or good, or justifiable.20 
In their shared attention to experiences of  
vulnerability as a condition through which the 
sense of  injustice emerges, both Shklar and Dia-
mond put a premium on the importance of  not 
presuming in advance that all forms of  need or 
all demands for attention are of  the same form. 
In important respects, they both presume that 
questions of  justice require the capacity for disc-
rimination, that is, for exercising exemplary judg-
ment.21 They both emphasize the importance of  
attending to the grammar of  public expressions 
of  harm in order to appreciate the substance of  
any claim for response that might be articulated in 
those expressions.
Taken together, as examples of  a broader 
strand of  thought, both Shklar and Diamond’s 
elaboration of  the theme of  the sense of  injusti-
ce represents a fundamental challenge to the nor-
mal way of  reasoning about these matters. Justice 
is normally assumed to be a positive ideal from 
which injustice is a deviation, and as the privileged 
idea from which injustice is conceptually derived. 
So, what happens if  we stop thinking of  justice as 
an ideal?
Beyond the normal model of justice
Shklar’s description of  the “normal” model of  
justice captures important features of  the way 
in which these issues are approached not just in 
moral and political philosophy, but also in critical 
social science as well. While geographers certainly 
have a keen sense of  “the normality of  injustice” 
that Shklar finds so lacking in philosophical ac-
counts of  justice, the wariness towards normative 
reasoning means that injustice is usually apprehen-
ded against the background of  an implicit model 
of  ideal justice. As a result, injustice shows up as 
20. See Cavell, S. 1990. Conditions Handsome and 
Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Per-
fectionism: The Carus Lectures. Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, pp. 101-128.
21. See Arendt, H. 2005. Introduction into Politics. In 
The Promise of Politics. New York, Shocken Books, 
pp. 93-200.
the absence of  justice in exactly the way that Sh-
klar finds typical of  the normal model. There are 
three versions of  this form of  reasoning in Geo-
graphy and related spatial disciplines. 
First, there is a style of  critical analysis in which 
injustice become visible by comparing actual pat-
terns of  disadvantage with ideal theories derived 
from philosophy. In this type of  analysis, the idea 
of  injustice remains tied to the demonstration of  
the absence of  justice. Second, there is a widesp-
read style of  theory in which appeals to superior 
ontologies or explanatory theories are presumed 
to trump what are regarded as the inherently in-
dividualizing tendencies of  normative reasoning 
about the justifiability of  particular social arrange-
ments. And third, there is a style of  analysis that 
presumes that simply demonstrating the empirical 
fact of  inequality is itself  equivalent to exposing 
injustice.
The problem with these forms of  social scien-
ce analysis is that they continue to presume that 
philosophy is a field in which to appeal when one 
needs ideals and principles. But philosophical ac-
counts of  justice do not necessarily lack adequate 
social science imaginations needed to explain de-
partures from justice or the endemic generation 
of  injustice. In fact, the standard social scientific 
trump of  philosophical concepts actually com-
pounds the most fundamental problem with nor-
mative theories of  justice. This problem lies in the 
temptation to theorise about these matters monolo-
gically, as if  injustice was an objectively identifiab-
le phenomenon that could be established either 
by arriving at a normatively robust foundational 
account of  justice; or by arriving at an epistemo-
logically or ontologically coherent account of  the 
causes of  exploitation or inequality. 
So, it turns out that these two approaches - the 
normatively philosophical and the explanatorily 
social scientific - are perfectly well suited to one 
another, each feeding off  presumed authority of  
the other: on the one hand to define the ideal of  
justice, and on the other to explain causal dyna-
mics. Neither approach adequately answers to 
Shklar’s challenge of  taking seriously the sense of  
injustice as a starting point for theorising about 
justice, nor the way in which this argument draws 
democracy into the centre of  such theorising. 
In light of  the preceding discussion, how 
might we move beyond Geography’s ambivalence 
about normative theory? The ambivalence arises 
from the conviction that normative philosophies 
tend to be too detached and universalistic, while at 
the same time holding fast to the assumption that 
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one must have a grasp of  some form of  univer-
sal principle in order to be able to support critical 
judgment. The assumption is a defining feature of  
the normal model of  thinking of  injustice as the 
absence of  some ideal condition, however reluc-
tantly that ideal might be specified. As Elizabeth 
Wolgast has argued, the idea that judgements of  
injustice require a standard inevitably “leads us 
back to the assumption that justice must be some 
kind of  ideal.”22 Thinking that we must in ad-
vance have a standard against which to judge af-
fairs gets the grammar of  justice the wrong way 
around. The meaning of  the concept of  justice is 
best approached as an emergent response to an 
expression of  harm, injury or wrong. The strong 
implication of  this simple sounding proposition is 
that justice is something developed not to satisfy 
an ideal model, but in relation to situated expres-
sions of  injustice: “We craft responses to wrong, 
our purpose being not to satisfy some preconcei-
ved picture of  justice but to address the snares of  
injustice.”23 In short, justice is not an ideal; it is 
a condition that is approached through processes 
of  repair, redress, reparation, and redistribution.  
5). Claims of  injustice 
To further clarify the significance of  the argu-
ment for the conceptual priority of  injustice, it is 
helpful to recall the argument made by Iris Mari-
on Young in her engagement with David Harvey’s 
accusation that so-called “postmodern” appro-
aches to justice implicitly appealed to universal 
criterion that they explicitly disavowed.24 Harvey 
asserted that to be able to call a situation socially 
unjust “presupposes that there are some universal-
ly agreed upon norms as to what we do or ought 
to mean by the concept of  social justice”.25 On 
Harvey’s interpretation, the critique of  universa-
lism in the name of  situated knowledge and posi-
tionality rendered “any application of  the concept 
of  social justice problematic”.26 Universalism here 
is equated with a striving for impartiality and ob-
jectivity. But rather than thinking that the problem 
at stake is one of  negotiating between universa-
lism and relativism, it might be the picture of  jud-
gment as a process of  applying universally agreed 
principles which is flawed. 
22. Wolgast, E. 1987. The Grammar of Justice. Ithaca 
NY, Cornell University Press, p. 137.
23. Wolgast, 1987, p. 145.
24. Young, I.M. 1998. Harvey’s complaint with 
race and gender struggles: a critical response. 
Antipode 30, 36-42. 
25. Harvey, D. 1996. Justice, Nature and the Geo-
graphy of Difference. Oxford, Blackwell, p. 341.  
26. Harvey, 1996, p. 342.
Young’s response to the idea that calling a si-
tuation unjust must involve at least an implicit 
deduction from generally agreed principles is that 
“this is not in fact how appeals to justice func-
tion in actual political life.”27 She suggested that 
injustice is not recognised by applying universal 
principles to actual situations. Rather, ideas of  
justice appear as the result of  the articulation of  
senses of  injustice: “Appeals to justice and claims 
of  injustice are not a result, they do not reflect 
an agreement; they are rather the starting point of  
a certain kind of  debate. To invoke the language 
of  justice and injustice is to make a claim, a claim 
that we together have obligations of  certain sorts 
to one another.”28 Young’s response to Harvey 
makes clear that what is at issue is not a contrast 
between foundational universalism and relativis-
tic particularism, but different ways of  thinking 
about how universal criteria actually work (as aut-
horitative references to impartial principles; or as 
situated claims for acknowledgement, inclusion 
and recognition). 
Young’s argument is that the discourse of  jus-
tice is first and foremost a register of  claims ma-
king. If  we are to affirm this proposition, then it 
is important to appreciate the double significan-
ce of  “claims” at work in this type of  argument 
about the priority of  injustice: the idea of  claims 
of  justice refers to the idea that matters of  justi-
ce arise in contexts in which existing patterns of  
power are contested through the voicing of  ob-
jections of  one form or another in the register of  
justice; but it also refers to the notion that these 
claims are subject to a democratic test by being 
passed through the medium of  public debate.29
The emphasis on the double sense of  claims al-
lows us to negotiate around Geography’s ambiva-
lence towards normative theories of  social justice. 
The idea that explanatory and normative priority 
should be given to the expressions of  wrong arti-
culated by victims of  domination, or exploitation, 
or oppression might well resonate easily enough 
amongst critically inclined geographers. But the 
valorisation of  claims of  injustice seems also to 
open the way for a form of  relativism of  its own, 
in which any claim of  injustice is accorded equal 
value. Certainly, arguments for the priority of  in-
justice are, as we have seen, intimately related to 
arguments about the primacy of  the passions in 
reasoning about moral action. These passions in-
27. Young, 1998, p. 40. 
28. Young, 1998, p. 40. 
29. Sen, A. 2009. The Idea of Justice. London, Allen 
Lane.
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clude negative emotions such as outrage and dis-
gust as much as positive ones such as compassion 
and pity.30 The emphasis on passionate expression 
associated with arguments for the priority of  in-
justice might well appear to make matters of  judg-
ment purely subjective.31 
In order to avoid the appearance that giving 
priority to injustice simply reproduces the prob-
lematic of  relativism in a new form, it is here 
that the second dimension of  the idea of  claims 
of  justice should be applied. It involves holding 
fast to a strongly dialogical sense of  claims of  in-
justice. These claims are presumed to be subject 
in principle to judgement and evaluation through 
a broadly inclusive public process of  deliberati-
on in which the validity of  claims is scrutinized. 
Furthermore, if  we are to reorient attention as 
claims of  injustice and demands for justice, then 
it must also be acknowledged that on their own 
such expressions do not specify appropriate res-
ponsive courses of  action. These too have to be 
worked through in practices of  public reasoning. 
In short, what is involved in following the lead 
provided by thinkers such Shklar, Diamond, and 
Young, amongst others, is a readiness to shift con-
ceptual attention away from authoritative determi-
nations of  social justice to exploring the possibili-
ty of  extending the scope of  democratic justice. 
Keeping in view the double sense of  claims of  
justice helps us see that the theme of  the priority 
of  injustice cannot be made equivalent to a simp-
le assertion of  the transparent fact of  injustice, 
or lead to the interpretation of  social movement 
mobilizations as what Axel Honneth has called 
“empirical indicators” of  injustice. One important 
reason for not making this move is that there is 
a danger that in so doing the importance placed 
on expressed claims can tempt us to pass over the 
ways in which a central feature of  structural injus-
tice might be the effective dampening of  victims’ 
capacity to express their own experiences of  harm 
and wrong. While giving priority to injustice might 
well focus attention on the ways in which move-
ments articulate claims of  injustice, this concern 
is placed within the context of  an analysis of  the 
relation between the phenomenologies of  harm 
and injury and the selective articulation of  these 
experiences in the public realm.32
30. See Solomon, pp. 242-296.
31. Wolgast, 1987, pp. 194-213.
32. See Moore, B. 1978. Injustice: The Social Bases 
of Obedience and Revolt. London, Macmillan; and 
Fricker, M. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the 
Ethics of Knowing. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Justice is not an ideal
I have attempted to trace some of  the ideas asso-
ciated with an emergent “paradigm” which seeks 
to give priority to injustice in the development of  
a critical theory of  democracy, a heterodox range 
of  thought marked by a shift away from strongly 
egalitarian frameworks in favour of  particular un-
derstandings of  freedom and non-domination a core 
political principles.33 I have suggested that the 
orientation to the priority of  injustice involves a 
focus of  critical attention on processes of  claims-
making and the contingent emergence of  a sense 
of  injustice. 
We should avoid the temptation of  thinking 
that what is involved in following the train of  
thought outlined here is a matter of  asserting the 
priority of  “practice” over “theory”. What is at 
stake is a shift in the understanding of  the vo-
cation of  critical theory. The shared understan-
ding across the heterodox tradition from which 
the theme of  the priority of  injustice emerges is 
that what makes a state of  affairs appear unjust 
- to those immediately on the receiving end of  
injustice or those called upon to act in response 
to such a state of  affairs - is not the reference 
to prior constructions of  what would count as a 
properly just arrangement. Accepting that this is 
the case does not cast us adrift from the safety 
accorded by having access to universal principles 
into a sea of  relativism. What is involved instead 
is an approach to theorising that is thoroughly 
relational, that is, one rooted in an understanding 
that practices of  justifiability are central to the 
identification of  injustice as injustice.34 The shift 
away from ideal theories of  justice follows from 
a recognition that people are positioned diffe-
rently in relation to structures of  injustice: as 
victims, perpetrators, bystanders, beneficiaries.35 
Rather than presuming that what is needed is a 
cast-iron theory of  justice to decide what is just 
33. See, for example, Pettit, P. 1999. Republican free-
dom and contestatory democracy. In I. Shapiro and C. 
Hacker-Cordón (eds.), Democracy’s Value. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 163-190; Hamilton, L. 
2015. Freedom Is Power: Liberty through Political 
Representation. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press; Lovett, F. 2010. A General Theory of Domi-
nation and Justice. Oxford, Oxford University Press; 
McCormick, J. 2011. Machiavellian Democracy. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press; and Shapiro, I. 
2012. On non-domination. University of Toronto Law 
Journal 62, 293-335.
34. Forst, R. 2014. Justification and Critique: Towards 
a Critical Theory of Politics. Cambridge, Polity Press. 
35. Sen, 2009, pp. 167-169.
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and unjust, what is needed is critical attention to 
the conditions of  dialogue and response through 
which manifest injustices are recognised and 
addressed (or not). 
The argument in favour of  a conceptual reor-
dering in which the sense of  injustice is accorded 
primacy over ideals of  justice changes what you 
think theory is good for. It requires giving up on 
the idea that universalism is menaced by relati-
vism and particularity, and thinking instead about 
the different registers in which claims to univer-
sality are articulated. It requires giving up on the 
scholastic presumption that it is possible to arrive 
at monological determinations of  justice against 
which worldly inequities can be revealed and con-
demned. It requires, in short, reviving the challen-
ge presented by David Harvey’s formula of  see-
king after “a just distribution justly arrived at.”36 
The challenge was deferred by Harvey’s disavowal 
of  “liberal formulations” of  matters of  justice.37 
The potential for working through the dual as-
pects of  Harvey’s formula resides in re-centring 
analytical and conceptual attention on the dyna-
mics of  claims of  justice; it requires attending to 
the relations between the situated emergence of  
felt senses of  injustice and the processes through 
which these claims are processed through practi-
ces of  public reasoning.
36. Harvey, D. 1973. Social Justice and the City, Lon-
don, Edward Arnold, p. 98.
37. See Katznelson, I. (1995). Social justice, 
liberalism, and the city. In A. Merrifield and E. 
Swyngedouw (eds.), The Urbanization of  Injustice. 
London: Lawrence and Wishart, pp.45-64. 
